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Abstract. Hardware aliasing occurs when the same logical address spo-
radically accesses different physical memory locations and is a problem
encountered by systems programmers (the opposite, software aliasing,
when different addresses access the same location, is more familiar to ap-
plication programmers). This paper shows how to compile so code works
in the presence of hidden deterministic hardware aliasing. That means
that a copy of an address always accesses the same location, and recal-
culating it exactly the same way also always gives the same access, but
otherwise access appears arbitrary and unpredictable. The technique is
extended to cover the emerging technology of encrypted computing too.
1 Introduction
Hardware aliasing describes “the situation where, due to either a hardware de-
sign choice or a hardware failure, one or more of the available address bits is
not used in the memory selection process.” [1] Its effect used to be familiar to
programmers and users alike, as the ‘DLL hell’ that the old 16-bit versions of
Windows were prone to. Dynamic linked libraries (DLLs) were problematic for
many reasons, but one was that different versions of the same library loaded at
the same memory address and all applications referenced the same in-memory
copy. So if one application loaded one version of the library then another loaded
another version, the first application would unpredictably, as far as the program
and user were concerned, find itself in the second library’s code. A virtual extra
address bit was the second application loading its version of the library.
DOS users were more familiar with the situation, as expanded memory man-
agers (for memory beyond 1MB) such as QuarterDeck’s QEMM [2] remapped
memory so the video graphics and bootstrap (BIOS) code both shared addresses
with random access memory (RAM). What a program accessed at runtime at a
given address depended on the memory manager, and that decided heuristically.
In consequence, program code needed to use standard memory access sequences
in order to trigger expanded memory reliably.
The recognisable symptom of hardware aliasing is that what looks to pro-
grams like the same memory address (the logical address), sporadically accesses
different memory locations (the physical address). With memory-mapped input-
output (IO), that may mean different peripheral devices.
Modern applications programmers are more familiar with the opposite soft-
ware aliasing, in which the same physical resource – memory location or pe-
ripheral device – is accessible via different logical addresses. But hardware alias-
ing has not gone away so much as become irrelevant as hardware has evolved
to present a more unified view to software. The paradigm is oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [3,4,5], a secure RAM solution since the 90s in which memory contents
are internally moved about and locations rewritten sporadically and indepen-
dently to frustrate cold boot attacks [6] (freezing the memory sticks to make
the temporary arrangement of electrical charge in RAM last long enough to be
analysed when powered off). That internal re-aliasing is not externally visible.
Hardware aliasing arises nowadays notably in the context of encrypted com-
puting [7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. That emerging technology is based on a processor in
which inputs, outputs, and all intermediate values exist only in encrypted form.
With an appropriate machine code instruction set and compiler, cryptographic
semantic security [14] obtains for runtime user data in that environment, relative
to the security of the encryption [15] (that means no deterministic or stochastic
attack has any more likelihood than chance of successfully guessing any bit of
user data, accepting the supposition that the encryption embedded in the ma-
chine is independently secure). The lemma there is “encrypted computing does
not compromise encryption.” The technology has potential for widespread adop-
tion as near conventional speeds are being attained in recent prototype designs
[16,17]. Because encryption is one-to-many, many bitwise different encryptions of
the same memory address are presented to the memory device by the processor
(memory is not privy to the encryption). From the point of view of the program,
hardware aliasing occurs. The programmer says to write x at address 123 and
the encrypted value 0x123456789a of 123 is passed to the memory management
unit (MMU) at runtime. If the programmer later says to read via address 123,
a different value 0xa987654321 that is an alternative encryption of 123 may be
passed as an address to the MMU, and some content y different from x returned.
An applications programmer must be able to remain ignorant of the hazard.
It turns out that there is a compiler mechanism that admits that, and this paper
sets it out. The present authors have made suggestions in the past as to what
to do [18], but experience has shown those to be too delicate in practice (array
accesses via pointer vs. index become incompatible). The technology developed
in this paper is more computationally inefficient but requires no semantic changes
to source code, and has been deployed and tested (c.f. the HAVOC compiler suite
for ansi C [19] and encrypted computing at http://sf.net/p/obfusc).
The solution arrived at depends on the underlying determinisn in processors.
Processors are designed to produce repeatable results. Thus the one-to-many-
ness of the encryption in the encrypted programming context is a function of
hidden extra ‘padding’ and/or ‘check’ bits that accompany the data beneath
the encryption. Those bits are calculated deterministically by the processor, and
depend on the data and the sequence of operations it goes through. The outcome
is so-called hidden deterministic hardware aliasing. The features of that are:
1. A machine code copy instruction copies the physical bit sequence exactly,
such that a copied address accesses the same memory location as the original;
2. repeating the same sequence of operations produces an address that has
exactly the same bit sequence and accesses the same location;
3. logically different addresses always have different physical bit sequences.
Condition 1 (‘faithful copy’) means the compiler can save an address for later
use after writing through it, and it will work to retrieve the written value. The
address must not be altered, not even by adding zero, as calculation alters the
hidden padding or check bits and hence the physical representation as a sequence
of bits, which then fails to access the same memory location as before.
Condition 2 (‘repeatability’) allows for some calculations on addresses, so
long as they are repeated exactly each time. That is useful because the machine
code instruction to read or write a memory location takes a base address a in a
register and adds a displacement d embedded in the instruction to get address
a + d for the access. It is impossible to avoid the processor doing at least that
one addition. But that does not matter because the same calculation is repeated
each time the address is needed, with the same sequence of bits resulting.
Condition 3 (‘no confusion’) guarantees that the representations as physi-
cal sequences of bits of what look like different addresses to the processor and
program do not step on each other. Equality as measured programmatically par-
titions the space of physical bit sequences representing addresses into disjoint
equivalence classes. Each is the set of possible representations as different bit se-
quences for a single logical address. That abstraction does capture the situation
where extra check bits or padding are ignored by the processor’s arithmetic.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains how to compile to
obtain code ‘safe against hardware-aliasing’ in the most general context. Sec-
tion 3 details the extension for compilation in the encrypted computing context.
The compiler must vary the generated object code maximally while maintain-
ing the same structure (and the same runtime trace structure). The technique
introduced in Section 2 copes with apparently unreliable addressing that is fun-
damentally deterministically generated and the technique of Section 3 extends
that to both generate and cope with apparently unreliable data.
2 Compilation for Hardware Aliasing
The compiler principle followed in this paper is that each address that is written
is intended to be saved for later read, as per Condition 1 of Section 1. The
conundrum in that is that it is saved at an address, which must also be saved,
and so on recursively. Condition 2 puts a backstop on the potentially infinite
recursion, allowing addresses that are calculated at compile time by the compiler
to be used instead. But a finite set of addresses cannot suffice for nested function
calls to unbounded depth, so the runtime stack must be involved. The real first
problem to be solved is how to manipulate the stack pointer so addresses and
other data might be saved and recovered reliably from stack.
2.1 Stack Pointer 101
Standard compiler-generated code decrements the stack pointer register sp by
the amount that will be needed for local storage in the function immediately on
entry to the function body, and increments it again just before exit:
call to function
. . .
function code start:
decrement sp
. . .
increment sp
return
That does not work in a hardware aliasing environment, because the increment
does not restore exactly the physical representation originally in the stack pointer
register. Instead, the caller gets back a different set of bits that means the same
thing to the processor. Being different, it references a different area via the MMU.
The frame pointer register fp must be co-opted to save the stack pointer in,
and the stack pointer restored from it on exit:
function code start:
copy sp to fp
decrement sp
. . .
copy fp to sp
return
That is the typical form of unoptimised function code from a compiler. Compiler
optimisation ordinarily replaces it with the previous (stack pointer -only) code.
The GNU gcc compiler (for example) with -fno-omit-frame-pointer on the
command line turns off optimisation and produces the code immediately above.
That is not quite perfect because the caller’s frame pointer register must also
be saved and later restored, as follows:
function code start:
save old fp to 1 below sp
copy sp to fp
decrement sp
. . .
copy fp to sp
restore old fp from 1 below sp
return
Saving below the caller’s stack pointer puts it in the callee’s stack area (‘frame’),
so its stack requirement (‘frame size’) is over-stated by one in the decrement to
make room for it. As many as the compiler wants of the caller’s registers can
be saved at the top of the callee’s frame. The application binary interface (ABI)
document for the platform specifies which registers the callee must save, and
which the caller code must expect may be trampled and must save for itself.
Rather than decrement the stack pointer again for blocks of code with their
own local declarations within a function declaration, the compiler holds the stack
pointer constant and reserves space for subframes within the function frame.
That makes the function frame uncomplicated to access from within sub-blocks.
The final code above works with hardware-aliasing. It sets up storage for the
function on the stack (the ‘local frame’) that can be reliably addressed as sp+ d
from within the function code in a hardware-aliasing environment, where d is a
displacement between 0 and the frame size, provided as a constant in a load or
store machine code instruction, and sp is the stack pointer register value.
2.2 Accessing Variables
Given the setup described above for the stack pointer, accessing function local
variables is simple. A word-sized local variable x is assigned a position n on the
stack and the compiler issues a load instruction to read from there to register r:
lw r n(sp) # load from offset n from sp
The processor does addition sp+d in executing the instruction, but repeats that
calculation at every access, so by Condition 2 of Section 1 the same sequence
of bits for the address is produced every time, and it accesses the same spot in
memory via the MMU. To write the variable, a store instruction is used instead:
sw n(sp) r # store to offset n from sp
For global variables, which reside at a compiler pre-decided address a in (heap)
memory, the compiler offsets from the zero register zer instead of sp:
lw r a(zer) # load from address a
The zero register contains a fixed zero value (that speeds up computations as zero
is frequently needed). The address presented to the MMU by this instruction is
a+ 0, which is a different sequence of bits to a (representing the same value to
the processor), but it is what is always presented so the same memory location
is always accessed. The compiler also pre-calculates the bit sequence for a + 0
and puts data into the executable/loadable file (ELF) for the program loader to
load at the location before program start, to provide an initial value.
Variables in the parent’s frame may also be accessed. If the function is defined
within another function, it is an interior function, and the parent’s local variables
should be notionally in scope for it. The parent’s frame pointer is handed down
at runtime in the c9 register (that register is specific to the platform ABI). The
register is saved through successive daughter function calls along with the frame
pointer register. Then a load or store instruction using c9 instead of sp or zer
reliably accesses the parent function’s local variables.
2.3 Accessing Arrays
The elements of array a can in principle be accessed either via a load or store
instruction with fixed displacement n from the array address a (that is ‘a[n]’),
or via a pointer with value p that ranges through the array starting at a and
steps through the elements until the desired one is reached, at which point a
load or store instruction with displacement 0 from the pointer (‘p[0]’) is applied
[18]. The two calculations for the address that is finally sent to the MMU are
respectively a + n and a + 1 + 1 · · ·+ 1 + 0. The calculations produce different
sequences of bits to be presented to the MMU for notionally the same address,
so the two methods are incompatible and one or the other must be preferred.
But in practice both have proved too restrictive. It is as common, for example,
for real code to step a pointer down through an array as to step up through it,
and the transformation the compiler needs to do is prohibitively expensive.
We have accepted as engineering compromise that array access is not for
general purposes going to be constant time in this environment. For arrays of
size N the compiler can provide access in logN time in a simple manner that
is safe against all programmed methods of calculating an index or pointer. On
our own encrypted computing platform, it is even preferable that array access
be linear time, because in order to obscure which array element is accessed, the
code must step through them all, summing each entry in turn into an accumu-
lator multiplied by either 1 or 0 (encrypted) according as the entry is the one
targeted or not. Since the multipliers are encrypted, an observer not privy to
the encryption cannot tell which multiplier is a 1 and which is a 0.
Linear complexity code will be presented first. To read (local) array element
a[n] the code tests n against each of 0, . . . , N−1 in turn and uses a compiler-
generated address for the lookup:
(n == 0)?a[0]:
(n == 1)?a[1]:
...
The equality tests are insensitive to the representation of the same value n of n
as possibly different sequences of bits since they take place in-processor, which
discards any hidden padding and check bits. This code always passes address
a+d to the MMU, where d is the displacement from the base of the array and a
is address sp + k, where k is the position on the stack allocated by the compiler
for the lowest array element a[0].
lw r d(r) # load from address a+ d with a in r to r
The address a is supplied to the base address register r by a prior instruction:
addi r sp k # add k to sp in r
lw r d(r) # load from address a+ d with a in r to r
and this always produces the same calculation sp + k for a.
Improving this code to logN complexity means using a binary tree structure
instead of linear lookup for the value n of n, deciding first if n is below N/2 or
above it, then on what side of N/4 or 3N/4 it is, and so on. Code for writing
to a[n] follows the same pattern, with store instead of load instructions at the
leaves of the binary tree or linear code sequence.
The same code structure works for access via a pointer p, provided the com-
piler is sure which array it points into. We have tightened the type system of the
source language (C, in our case) so the pointer is declared along with the name
of a (possibly overlarge) array a into which it will definitely point at runtime:
int *p restrict a
The restrict keyword selects the target array for the pointer. This embellishment
means a certain amount of porting has to be done for existing code, marking out
global areas into which pointers can point. It generally means declaring a global
array from which objects of the kind pointed to are allocated from, or declaring a
function as interior to another function where the target of the pointer is defined
as a local. As the new pointer type is narrower than the original and (ideally)
we make no semantic changes, confidence in type safety should be increased.
Then the following code does lookup via pointer p:
(p == a+0)?a[0]:
(p == a+1)?a[1]:
...
It is as insensitive to the way the pointer p is calculated in a dereference ∗p as
is the lookup code for a[n] insensitive to the way n is calculated. The code can
similarly be made over to logN complexity with a binary tree lookup structure,
and converted to write by replacing load instructions at the leaves with stores.
These constructions make pointer access the same as access via array index.
If a size N of the array is declared dynamically in the local function, then
more dynamic code must be generated. What matters is that the compiler always
causes the same calculation to be used for the address finally sent to the MMU.
The following generated code writes reliably through pointer p:
for (int d=0; d<N; d++)
if (p == a+d) { a[d]=x; break; }
The address passed to the MMU is sp+k+(0+1+· · ·+1)+0, where a = sp+k is
the address of array a, and the 1s are repeated d times to address a dth element
of the array. The same form must be used for indexed write:
for (int d=0; d<N; d++)
if (n == d) { a[d]=x; break; }
The calculation for the final address passed to the MMU is the same and always
accesses the same memory location as per Condition 2 of Section 1.
2.4 Multi-word Types
Records with named fields (‘struct’ in C) are treated by the compiler as arrays
and the field name is translated to an array displacement. The declaration
struct { int a; int b; } x
declares x with two named fields, a and b, each one word wide. It occupies
two words on the stack at displacements k and k′ (the value k + 1) respectively
from the stack pointer. The compiler generates accesses to x.a and x.b just as
it would for any local variables situated there, by calling
lw r k(sp) # load from x.a
to read from x.a, for example. The address passed to the MMU is sp + k. To
access x.b, the address passed is sp + k′ instead. With the code the compiler
generates for array access, source code attempting unsafely to access the fields
of the struct as though it were an array also works, which helps in porting.
Long atomic types such as double are also treated this way (i.e., as arrays)
when distinct machine code instructions are required to access each component
words on the stack. But most platforms have double-word load and store in-
structions that will fetch/write two words at once:
ld r k(sp) # double word load
and only the address of the first word is given in this case. Registers are indexed
as pairs for this instruction, and the pair to r is loaded up by the instruction
too. But then source code that does try to access the second word as though
the double were an array of length 2 will not work. The address used by the
MMU will be one more than the bit sequence for sp + k but the address passed
to the MMU by the array-oriented code generated by the compiler will be the
bit sequence for sp+ k′, where k′ is k+1. Those are different. Overall, it is safer
that the compiler not generate double word instructions.
2.5 Short Types
The difficulty remarked above in accessing the second word of a double in
memory translates to a difficulty in accessing the individual bytes of a word.
The platform usually provides instructions that access memory a byte at a time,
but the address that the MMU knows for the second byte of a word will be
one more than a, the sequence of bits that the processor produces to represent
the address of the word. If the processor produces instead a sequence of bits
representing a+1, that in all likelihood will not be the same. Padding and check
bits may differ. To the processor it is all the same, but the MMU is not privy
to the secret of what bits to take notice of and what to discard, and to it the
addresses look different, and access different bytes in memory.
For index-oriented access to the characters of a string a, the compiler gener-
ates code that splits the character index i into index d for a word consisting of a
sequence of 4 characters, and offset j for the wanted character within the word:
d = i/4;
j = i%4;
Then the character is obtained via an array-of-words lookup and arithmetic:
(a[d] / 256j) % 256 # jth char of dth word
If the string starts in the kth stack position and k′ = k + d, the a[d] part will
result in the form of load instruction already noted in Section 2.4:
lw r k′(sp) # read at offset k′ from sp
In our own compiler for our own (encrypted computing) platform, we have pre-
ferred to avoid the complication and pack characters only one to a word, at the
cost of an inefficient use of memory. Then no special treatment is required. That
is also helpful in the encrypted computing environment because characters have
reduced entropy (the choice is from 256 alternatives) and it is better from the
point of view of defense against stochastically-based attacks to bury them in
whole words beneath the encryption, where the rest of the word is random.
3 Encrypted Computing
Although hardware aliasing takes place ubiquitously from the point of a program
running in an encrypted computing environment, that is not the only hurdle that
a compiler for that context has to overcome. In particular, for the security of
the encryption, the compiler has to vary the underlying code and data in order
to swamp out human programming influences that could lead to statistically
based attacks. If zero is the most common data item flowing through a processor
running human-generated code, it could pay to mount a ‘plaintext’ attack [20]
on the encryption supposing that a given encrypted datum is zero.
3.1 Address Displacement Constants
Instead of generating a load instruction to read from a variable at position n on
the stack like this (Section 2.2):
lw r n(sp) # load from offset n from sp
the compiler will issue the instruction with a different displacement constant ∆:
lw r ∆(s) # load from offset n from sp
Here ∆ is a previously chosen random number and the register s has been pre-set
with the value sp + n−∆ to accommodate this, where sp is the nominal value
for the stack pointer. The bit sequence passed to the MMU is from
sp + n−∆+∆
which is always the samewhen that calculation is repeated (Condition 2, Section 1).
The compiler always emits the same instruction pattern, but it has to ensure
separately that the ∆ used is always the same for the same n. It maintains a
vector ∆ indexed by stack location n, as well as a similar vector ∆Z for the
heap. Then the ∆ in the load instruction above is ∆n:
lw r ∆n(s) # load from offset n from sp
The change from n to∆n for the displacement constant is a mark of the passage
from the hardware aliasing context to the aliasing and encrypted computing
context. In the latter context the generated code must vary over recompilations
as further explained below. The change from n to a randomly chosen ∆n as an
embedded constant in the instruction is part of that.
3.2 Content Deltas
As remarked above, the stack pointer sp does not contain the value sp that it
notionally should have but instead is offset from that by a random value δ. That
is true of the content of every register at every point in the generated code. The
compiler maintains a vector δR of the offset delta for content in each register r,
varying it as it passes through the code. Let a non-side-effecting expression e of
the source language be translated by the compiler Cr[−] to machine code mc
that targets the result for register r. Let the state of the runtime machine before
mc runs be s0, let the nominal value for the expression be [e]
s0 , then
(mc, δR) = Cr [e]
s0
mc
 s1 where s1(r) = [e]
s0 + δR r
The ‘nominal value’ [e]s0 of e is is formalisable via a canonical construction: map
a variable x in the expression to its register location rx (the runtime value is
offset by a delta δRrx), checking the content of rx in the state and discounting
the delta to get [x]s0 = s0(rx)− δR rx. Arithmetic in the expression is formalised
recursively, with [e1 + e2]
s0 = [e1]
s0 + [e2]
s0 , etc.
The compiler also maintains a vector δ for the delta offsets of stack contents
indexed by stack location n, and a vector δZ for the delta offset of heap contents
indexed by heap location n. A window onto code generated for access to the nth
location on the stack shows:
addi r sp k # where k = n− δR sp−∆n
lw r ∆n(r) # read nth location on stack
The address is placed in r for the load and then overwritten with the content
loaded from the location. The MMU receives the bit sequence for the calculation
sp′ + k +∆n where k = n− δR sp−∆n
The stack pointer register sp contains the value sp′ which is offset by δR sp from
the nominal value sp of the stack pointer. Summing, the address has the value
sp + n. The calculation is the same every time so the bit sequence passed to the
MMU for the address is the same every time, by Condition 2 of Section 1. A
write replaces the load by store and passes the same bit sequence to the MMU.
The δ and ∆ values are changed randomly by the compiler at (just before)
every point in the code where a write occurs. The delta for any register r is
changed at every write to it. A theorem in work of ours presently under review
[21] measures the variability in a runtime trace in terms of its entropy viewed as
a stochastic random variable over recompilations of the same code (the entropy
is the expectation E[− log2 p(T )] for traces T that occur with probability p(T ),
and it expresses the number of freely variable bits that parametrise the trace):
Theorem 1. The entropy in a trace over recompilations is the sum of the en-
tropies of every instruction that writes that appears in it, counted once each.
An instruction has entropy inasmuch as its effect can be varied by the compiler
from recompilation to recompilation by changing the constants embedded in it.
Machine code instructions like load and store that merely copy from one place
to another do not contribute entropy to the trace except as they may write to
different places. Variations in the displacement constant in the load instruction
contribute to that by changing the calculation and hence the bit sequence passed
to the MMU for the same address.
The compiler varies the contribution ∆n in the addi instruction in the load
sequence above, supplying a potential 32 bits of entropy (or 64 bits, etc., depend-
ing on the word size). But ∆n is fixed through reads, and only varied at writes,
so it is old news when it runs and there is no entropy contribution (unless read
is not preceded by write – perhaps it is pre-loaded read-only program data).
Consideration of detail like that apart, the compiler’s job in the encrypted
computing context is to do everything it can to maximise entropy in the trace:
Theorem 2. The trace entropy is maximised when the compiler varies every in-
struction that writes individually to the maximal extent possible (i.e., randomly,
with flat distribution) from recompilation to recompilation.
That varies the data in the trace at runtime between different recompilations
and provides a stochastic setting in which an attacker cannot be sure what the
numerical value of the unencrypted data should be, even in terms of a statistical
tendency, because all inputs by the programmer are swamped by the contribution
from the compiler. The latter provides an extra, additive, uniformly distributed
input at each instruction at which it is able to. That distribution has maximal
entropy over the 32 bits (or 64 bits, etc.) available. The combined signal from
programmer and compiler cannot have less entropy (‘Shannon’s Law’ [22]), so it
too has maximal entropy at that point, which means that the values at that point
in the trace beneath the encryption are uniformly and evenly distributed as a
probability distribution. That means data beneath the encryption in the trace is
no more vulnerable to statistical plaintext attack than random (encrypted) data
is, though the program is designed by a human and executed deterministically.
Structural limits on the compiler-induced variation are explained below.
3.3 Loops
Loops (while, for, backward goto, etc.) induce losses in the freedom of choice for
compiled code. Let the statement compiler C[−] produce codemc from statement
s of the source language, changing the combined databaseD = (∆,∆Z , δ, δZ, δR)
to Ds in the process. For legibility, pairs (D, x) will be written D : x here:
Ds : mc = C[D : s]
The notation makes explicit that the compiler is side-effecting on D.
Compiling a loop while e s standardly means emitting code mc constructed
from the code mce for e and the code mcs for s with the following shape:
start: mce # compute e in r
beqz r end # goto to end if r zero
mcs # compute s
b start # goto start
end:
The compiler produces mce, then mcs, in that order:
De : mce = Cr[D : e]
Ds : mcs = C [D
e : s]
That does not work as-is, because the code does not at the end of the loop
reestablish the deltas that existed at loop start, so the second time through,
much goes wrong. Extra code is needed after mcs, so-called ‘trailer’ instructions.
A trailer instruction that restores the content of register r to its initial delta
δR r off the nominal value from the final delta δ
s
R
r off nominal is
addi r r k # add k = δR r − δ
s
R r
Trailer instructions that restore the nth stack location offset also restore the
displacement constant used in load and store. The temporary register t0 is loaded
using the final loop displacement∆sn, the offset of the content is modified, then
stored back using the original loop displacement∆n, ready for the next traverse:
addi t0 sp j # j = n− δR sp−∆
sn
lw t0 ∆sn(t0) # load nth stack location
addi t0 t0 k # modify by k = δn− δsn
addi t1 sp l # l = n− δR sp−∆n
sw ∆n(t1) t0 # store nth stack location
The first two instructions are exactly the read stack code of Section 3.2, and the
last two instructions are the corresponding write stack code. The stack pointer
does not change from beginning to end of the loop, nor does the offset δRsp of
its content from the nominal value sp, so it appears unaltered through that code.
The instructions above are determined by choices of deltas by the compiler
for earlier instructions. It is impossible to execute the trailer instructions without
traversing the loop body, which will execute those earlier instructions, so these
trailer instructions are always ‘old news’ and introduce no entropy into the trace.
3.4 Conditionals
The synchronisation problem described above occurs wherever two distinct con-
trol paths join, and after an if-then-else block in particular. The final deltas
in the two branches/paths must be equalised. The compiler emits final ‘trailer’
instructions for that purpose. Code mc for if e s1 else s2 standardly has shape:
Table 1. Trace for Ackermann(3,1)
PC instruction trace updates
...
35 addi t0 a0 -86921031 t0 ← -86921028
36 addi t1 zer -327157853 t1 ← -327157853
37 beq t0 t1 2 240236822
38 addi t0 zer -1242455113 t0 ← -1242455113
39 b 1
41 addi t1 zer -1902505258 t1 ← -1902505258
42 xor t0 t0 t1 -1734761313 1242455113 1902505258
t0 = -17347613130
43 beqz t0 9 -1734761313
53 addi sp sp 800875856 sp ← 1687471183
54 addi t0 a1 -915514235 t0 ← -915514234
55 addi t1 zer -1175411995 t1 ← -1175411995
56 beq t0 t1 2 259897760
57 addi t0 zer 11161509 t0 ← 11161509
...
143 addi v0 t0 42611675 v0 ← 13 # result
...
147 jr ra
STOP
Legend
op. fields semantics
addi r0 r1 k r0 ← r1 + k
b i pc ← pc + i
beq r1 r2 i if r1=r2 thenpc←pc+i
jr r pc ← r
xor r0 r1 r2 r0 ← (r1+k1 )̂ (r2+k2)−k0
k1 k2 k0
register semantics
a0,a1,. . . function argument
pc program counter
ra return address
sp stack pointer
t0,t1,. . . temporaries
v0,v1,. . . return value
zer null placeholder
lexicon semantics
i program count increment
k instruction constant
r content of r
start: mce # compute e in r
beqz r else # goto to else if r zero
mcs1 # compute s1
b end # goto end
else: mcs2 # compute s2
end:
where the order the compiler works in is mce, mcs1 , mcs2 :
De : mce = Cr[D : e ]
Ds1 : mcs1 = C [D
e : s1]
Ds2 : mcs2 = C [D
s1 : s2]
But that code does not work because it also needs trailer instructions after mcs2
to set the final deltas in the ‘else’ branch equal to the final deltas in the ‘then’
branch. Each has the same pattern as a trailer instruction for loops.
Other notable places where trailer instructions are required are the label
targets of gotos, and at return from functions. Calls of interior functions also
require ‘trailers’, but before the call, because the context in which the function
was defined must be reestablished (effectively a ‘come from’ imperative).
4 Implementation
Our own prototype C compiler http://sf.net/p/obfusc covers ansi C and
GNU C extensions, including statements-as-expressions and expressions-as-statements,
gotos, arrays, pointers, structs, unions, floating point, double integer and float-
ing point data. It is missing longjmp and efficient strings (char and short are
the same as int), and global data shared across code units (a linker issue due
Table 2. Trace for sieve showing hidden bits in data (right). Stack read in-
struction lines are in red, address base for lookup and address displacement in
blue.
PC instruction trace updates | hidden
...
22340 addi t1 sp -418452205 t1 ← -877254954|1532548040
22360 bne t0 t1 84
22384 addi t1 sp -407791003 t1 ← -866593752|1532548040 # read local array
22404 lw t0 866593746(t1) t0 ← -866593745|1800719299 # a[7] at sp+40
22424 addi t0 t0 -1668656853 t0 ← 1759716698|1081155516
22444 b 540
22988 addi t1 zer 1759716697 t1 ← 1759716697|1325372150
23008 bne t0 t1 44
...
23128 addi t0 sp -1763599776 t0 ← 2072564771|-1935092797 # read local variable
23148 lw t0 -2072564772(t0) t0 ← 2072564779|-1773201679 # i at sp+45
23168 addi t0 t0 1723411350 t0 ← -498991167|-981581771
23188 addi t0 t0 -1862832992 t0 ← 1933143137|-1629507929
23208 addi v0 t0 -1933143130 v0 ← 7 |1680883739 # return
...
23272 jr ra
STOP
to the who-decides-the-delta conundrum for code compiled first but referencing
as-yet uncompiled external global data).
A trace1 of the Ackermann function2 [23] compiled by that compiler is shown
in Table 1. The trace illustrates how the compiler’s variation of the delta offsets
for register content through the code results in randomly generated constants
embedded in the instructions and randomly offset runtime data.
Running a Sieve of Eratosthenes program3 for primes shows how memory
access is affected by address displacement constants. The final part of the trace
is shown in Table 2 with two stack reads in red and the address base and address
displacement in blue. The assignments to these stack locations are up-trace and
do have the same address base and displacements as in the later reads:
19300 addi t1 sp -407791003 t1 ← -866593752|1532548040
19320 sw 866593746(t1) t0 mem[-6|-712377144]
← -866593745|1800719299
...
20884 addi t1 sp -1763599776 t1 ← 2072564771|-1935092797
20904 sw -2072564772(t1) t0 mem[-1|1518992593]
← 2072564779|-1773201679
The memory addresses -6, -1 reflect that the stack grows down from top of
memory (-1), but it is the combinations -6|-712377144 and -1|1518992593 of
address and hidden bits together that are looked up by the MMU.
1 Initial and final content offset deltas are set to zero here, for readability.
2 Ackermann C code: int A(int m,int n) { if (m == 0) return n+1; if (n == 0)
return A(m-1, 1); return A(m-1, A(m, n-1)); }.
3 Sieve C code: int S(int n ) { int a[N]={[0. . . N-1]=1,}; if (n>N||n<3) return 0; for
(int i=2; i<n; ++i) { if (!a[i]) continue; for (int j= 2*i; j<n; ++j) a[j]=0; }; for
(int i=n-1; i>2; --i) if (a[i]) return i; return 0; } .
5 Conclusion
This paper has described the compilation of imperative low level source code for
a platform that has hardware aliasing with hidden determinism. The technique
depends on the compiler controlling exactly the address displacement and ad-
dress base for load and store instructions so that they are always the same for
repeat accesses to what is intended to be the same memory location. That means
they are either copies or the calculations for them exactly reprise the earlier cal-
culations. It is surprising that the trick can be worked in such a systematic way,
but it can further be extended to both generate and cover for displacements in
the data content of registers and memory in the context of encrypted comput-
ing. There it is essential for the security of encrypted data passing through the
machine that it may have been varied by a maximal entropy input from the
compiler, which swamps statistical biases that arise from human programming.
The mechanism described in this paper is log or linear complexity for array
access. Constant complexity would be possible but at the price of making index-
and pointer-based accesses mutually incompatible, which would necessitate in-
vasive changes in ported source code.
In the encrypted computing context, the existence of this kind of compiler
validates those processor designs that pass encrypted addresses as well as data
to the memory unit, which remains fully ignorant of the encryption.
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